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SCHOLTES v. McCOLGAN
of those zoning regulations in which the primary purpose
is to acquire a public easement of avigation in the "lower
reaches" of the airspace for the taking off and landing of
planes, without the payment of just compensation to the
private landowners adjacent to such airports. Further-
more it supports the position taken by the Baltimore City
Court, that the exercise of the power of eminent domain
and not the police power is the proper procedure for ac-
quiring adjacent air space rights for the taking off and
landing of planes.
RESTRICTIONS AGAINST OCCUPANCY-EXISTENCE
OF A GENERAL PLAN
Scholtes v. McColgan'
Appellant brought suit in the Circuit Court for Balti-
more County to restrain the appellee from selling a dwell-
ing or any part of a tract of land to any person of the Negro
race or from permitting any person of the Negro race to
occupy it; an order dismissing the bill of complaint was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Although some contradictory evidence was presented
at the trial, the Court considered the following facts as
substantially correct: The appellant purchased two lots
from the appellee, the first in 1940, the second in 1942.
Both deeds contained a clause restricting occupation of
the property "by any Negro or any person of Negro extrac-
tion", except in the capacity of a domestic servant. The
lots purchased by the appellant were part of a tract of
about 74 acres located on Falls Road in Baltimore County,
which had been conveyed to the appellee in 1903 without
restriction. Only three other lots had been sold out of this
tract during the 40 years in which the appellee had owned
it until the sale of a dwelling situated on part of the land
in question to Negroes in the early part of 1944 brought the
matter into court. In the three other sales referred to,
one deed contained no restrictions; the other two were
conveyed under restrictions similar to those contained in
the deeds to the appellant, although one contained a clause
providing that the restrictions were not to bind or apply
to any other property of the vendor except that "herein
described". The 74-acre tract had for many years been
bounded on the south by a group of houses belonging to
1 184 Md. 480, 41 A. 2d (1945).
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colored people and the appellee had frequently stated he
did not want to see any further extension of the colored
development; he had made this desire clear to the appel-
lant and the purchasers of two of the other lots, but after
he had been unsuccessful in selling another part of the
land for the erection of a building to be used as a night-
club because of the objections of nearby property owners,
he felt his efforts had been unappreciated and accordingly
he sold the dwelling in question to Negroes.
Although the restrictions in the appellant's deed ap-
plied only to the occupancy of the land, his bill of com-
plaint went further and asked that the appellee be enjoined
from conveying any of the land to Negroes, as well as per-
mitting such persons to occupy it. Thus the complaint
asked the Court to impose a restriction on alienation which
was, of course, refused, the Court relying on established
Maryland law. 2 At best, all the appellant could obtain,
the Court continued, would be an injunction preventing
the appellee from selling the land without putting in the
deed or deeds to any parts sold, restrictions as to occupancy
only; and under the facts considered it was felt he was
not even entitled to that.
The Court cited McKenrick v. Savings Bank3 in which
Judge Offutt exhaustively summarized the law and stated
that only where such restrictions are part of a uniform
general scheme or plan of development and use which
affect the land granted and the land retained alike, may
they be enforced in equity; the existence of such a scheme
is a question of the intention of the parties and the burden
of showing such intention is on the party seeking to en-
force the restrictions. Applying Judge Offutt's summary,
the Court held that as the intention of the parties was a
question of fact to be determined from all the circum-
stances of the case and that from the evidence before it
there was no convincing indication that any plan of re-
stricted development of the land was ever intended, the
appellant had failed to meet the burden required and that
the action of the lower court should be affirmed.
It is difficult to find fault with this result under the
facts stated, but the case raises several interesting points
Clark v. Clark, 99 Md. 356, 58 A. 24 (1904). Modified by Gerke v.
Colonial Trust Co., 114 Md. 289, 79 A. 587 (1911), to exclude trust property
from the rule. See also Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 A. 330,
114 A. L. R. 1227 (1937), noted (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 363, where restraints
on alienation are clearly distinguished from restraints on use and occu-
pancy.
3 174 Md. 118, 197 A. 580 (1938).
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which invite comment. The rule is, as stated by the Mary-
land Court, that the existence of a general plan is a ques-
tion of fact." It may be evidenced in writing or verbally."
In most cases a general plan of restricted development is
established by evidence of a plat or diagram of the area
containing restrictions.' Other factors which have in-
fluenced courts to find conclusive evidence of a general
plan include the use of advertisements and distribution of
circulars by the developer announcing his intent to restrict
occupancy and use;7 also through the existence of various
deeds to grantees conveying parts of the same original
tract of land, all containing similar restrictions.' The
tendency in Maryland is to favor the unrestricted use of
property; this is illustrated by the recent holding' by the
Court of Appeals that the existence of a plat describing a
general plan, but without restrictions on it, does not indi-
cate the adoption of any uniform restrictive plan of de-
velopment.
Although proof of a general plan is probably more per-
suasive to the courts if in writing, the Maryland Court of
Appeals in the Scholtes case gave some consideration to
the aspect of such proof through evidence of oral state-
ments made by the appellee at various times."0 . The
Court found these statements insufficient, but had some
of the evidence showing the lack of a general scheme been
absent, they might well have played a larger part in the
decision. The restriction against occupancy had been in-
serted in four of the five deeds which had been given to
parts of the land sold, and the grantor had made several
oral statements of his intention to restrict the use of the
property; this expressed desire to keep the tract exclusive-
ly for white people could easily be implied to affect his
own subsequent use of the part retained as well as the lots
sold to the various grantees. The oral expressions of in-
tention made to those to whom he gave deeds carrying the
restriction might very well have been regarded as his own
agreement to carry out the same restriction on the land re-
'Allen v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 248 Mass. 378, 143 NE 499,
33 A. L. R. 669 (1924) -The A. L. R. comment covers cases in various other
jurisdictions.
Edwards v. West Woodridge Theatre Co.. 55 Fed. (2d) 524 (App. D. C.,
1931) ; Lewis v. Gollner, 129 NY 227, 29 NE 81 (1891).
Hartt v. Rueter, 223 Mass. 207. 111 NE 3045 (1916).
Kempner v. Simon, 195 NY Supp. 333 (1922).8 McNeil v. Gary, 40 App. D. C. 397, 46 LRA (NS) 1113 (1913).
Matthews v. Kernewood, Inc., 184 Md. 297, 40 A. 2d 522 (1944). Case
decided three months prior to the Scholtes case.
,1 184 Md. 480. 484-485. 41 A. 2d 479, 481-482 (1945).
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tained. But, as stated, the Court found no agreement on
the vendor's part similar to that which he exacted from
the purchasers. This is generally regarded as tending to
show the absence of a general plan enuring to the benefit
of all the purchasers." Conversely, where such an agree-
on the vendor's part is found, a vendee may successfully
maintain a suit in equity to enjoin the sale of any of the
land without such a restriction. 12
Whether oral expressions of intent, such as found in the
Scholtes case, are enforceable as a restriction binding on
the grantor is complicated by the fact that some authorities
regard a restrictive covenant as a contract concerning land,
while others think of it as an equitable servitude, appur-
tenant to the land. To enforce the former a suit for specific
performance, or possibly for breach, is the remedy, and
whether or not the "contract" is in writing would make no
difference, for an agreement concerning land, unlike a con-
tract to sell land or the actual conveyance of property,
need not be evidenced in writing.13 But if regarded as an
equitable servitude the Statute of Frauds might require
a writing. It can well be argued that a restriction against
use, as it imposes a serious encumbrance on the land, must
be in writing as this, in effect, is an interest in land. If
we accept this view it makes unenforceable all restrictive
plans created only by oral statements, their invalidity
being attributable to the failure to put them in writing.
Thus, had the Maryland Court in the Scholtes case adopted
this latter approach all consideration of the oral expres-
sions of intent could have been eliminated immediately.
The authorities seem about equally divided between
the two theories, with Professor Tiffany,14 former Chief
Justice Stone 5 and Dean Ames" following the contract
theory; and Dean Pound,17 along with Professor Pomeroy"8
and Judge Clark, 9 adopting the equitable servitude doc-
trine. By its nature, a contract is more easily enforced
11 Sharp v. Ropes, 110 Mass. 381 (1872). For a general discussion on
this point see 3 TIFFANY, RAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) Sees. 861-869.
22 Supra, n. 5.
1 Hall v. Solomon, 61 Conn. 476, 23 A. 876 (1892) ; Thornton v. Schobe,
79 Colo. 25, 243 Pac. 617 (1925).
1,3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) Sec. 861.
25 Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of a Stranger to a Contract
(1918) 18 Col. L. Rev. 291; (1919) 19 Col. L. Rev. 177.11 Ames, Specific Performance for and again8t Stranger8 to the Contract
(1904) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 174.1 7 Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919 (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 813.
18 Pomeroy, EQUITY JURseuDEN.c (5th ed. 1941) Sec. 1295.19 Clark, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND (1929) pp. 148-
156.
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than an equitable servitude, and thus it follows that the
contract theory tends to increase restrictions on the use
of property, for the more easily a restriction is enforced
the more readily it may be read into transfers of property.
On the other hand, adoption of the equitable easement
doctrine has the effect of lessening restrictions on the use
of property because of the formalities required in creating
them. The decision in the Scholtes case and the ruling in
Matthews v. Kernewood20 indicate that only the most posi-
tive evidence of a general plan is strong enough to justify
the enforcement of restrictions on use and occupancy in
Maryland. Such an attitude is consistent with the equita-
ble servitudes theory of restrictive covenants.
ATTORNEY'S RIGHT TO INSPECT MOTOR VEHICLE
ACCIDENT REPORTS
Pressman v. Elgin1
Petitioner-appellant, a member of the Bar, brought the
present mandamus proceeding against defendant-appellee,
the State Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, to compel the
latter to keep open for public inspection the reports of
motor vehicle accidents received by him. The trial court
denied the petition but, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed and held the petitioner entitled to inspect the
records, subject to necessary amendment as to the scope of
his request.2
The Court held that the older provision of the Motor
Vehicle law8 which required the Commissioner to permit
public inspection of all statements filed with him prevailed
over the later provision of the Financial Responsibility
Act,4 which merely provided that the compulsory reports
required of motorists concerning accidents should not be
admissible in evidence, nor otherwise referred to, in any
damage suit litigation concerning the accident reported.
The decision in the principal case suggests some inter-
esting considerations of the ideas of policy underlying the
10 Supra, n. 9.
' 50 A. 2d 560 (Md. 1947).
2 Petitioner was held entitled to inspect only the public records on file
at the time of the granting of the prayer, whereas his petition included
those thereafter to be filed, 50 A. 2d 560, 564.
a Md. Code Supp. (1943) Art. 66%, Sec. 12, formerly Md. Code (1939)
Art. 56, Sec. 149.
4 Md. Laws 1945, Ch. 456, Art. 66%, Secs. 10A, 10H.
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